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WHY LATINAS SWING LEFT: 
Ideological Self-Identification in Conservative Chile 




University of New Hampshire, May, 2009 
As recently as 2006, Latin American citizens have shifted to the left ideologically. 
This study begins by exploring the ideological orientation of women in socially 
conservative Chile. After analyzing existing literature on gender and ideology, this study 
goes on to suggest what has led Chilean women to ideologically self-identify to the left. 
Using a combination of case study analysis and Latin America Public Opinion Project 
analysis, this thesis proposes that specific social demographics, attitudes toward social 
issues, the economy, and government intervention are related to the ideological 
orientation of women. This study focused on multivariate ordinary least squares 
regression model analysis to evaluate the suggested hypotheses. Additionally, this thesis 
will address the implications an ideological shift to the left may have on Chilean society 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, Latin Americans have drifted slightly to the left of the ideological 
pendulum This shift in ideological identification is unusual, as in the past Latin 
Americans have tended to position themselves to the right of the ideological spectrum 
compared to other global regions. Recently, however, the region has witnessed a rise of 
left-wing presidents such as Chavez of Venezuela, Correa of Ecuador, Morales of 
Bolivia, and Bachelet in Chile. While this shift may be slight, in some cases, it is a drift 
with consequences. Seligson finds that a leftist ideological orientation in most Latin 
American countries is strongly correlated with an unfavorable view of democratic 
governance and less support for civil rights and civil liberties As a result of the lack of 
confidence Latin American citizens have for democratic institutions, "populist" leaders 
have been given the go ahead to take control.2 Seligson finds that the problem with 
populism is its association with a belief that democracy, and democratic institutions, are 
ineffective and inefficient expressions of the "people's will." Instead, populist leaders 
carry out their own will, crushing dissent and curbing people's rights and civil liberties.3 
1
 Seligson (2007) "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America," Journal of Democracy vol. 18 
no.3pg.83. 
2
 Seligson (2007). 
3Seligson(2007). 
1 
Chile has proven to be an exception in this trend. Seligson found that a shift to 
the left in Chile corresponded to support for democracy, civil liberties, and democratic 
institutions. This finding is reaffirmed by politics at the national level, when in an 
unusual turn of events, centre -left candidate Michelle Bachelet became Chile's first 
woman president running on a platform for social change, also advocating close ties to 
the United States and free trade. Bachelet came out on top by "attracting" liberal voters 
who had leftist ideological preferences.4 
A liberal ideological orientation in Chile is surprising in a country known for its 
deeply entrenched social conservatism. Historically, men and especially women in Chile 
have strongly identified with social conservatism. Seligson's research found that an 
adherence to social conservatism is no longer the norm in Chile Social conservatism, 
once so entrenched within Chilean society, has been gradually replaced with a preference 
for liberal ideology. This study will examine such trends more closely, focusing on 
women's ideological orientation. 
Historically, Chilean women have been typecast as staunch conservatives. 
Conservative parties have been the groups that have aimed to incorporate women into the 
political processes. Although Chilean women were not granted the right to vote until 
1935, in 1917 the Conservative Party in Chile called for a law to be passed extending the 
right to vote to Chilean women.5 Conservative parties sought to increase women's 
participation in politics because they believed that by doing so it would increase support 
for their causes. Indeed, the incorporation of women into politics strengthened traditional 
4
 Seligson (2007) "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America," Journal of Democracy vol. 18 
no.3pg. 83. 
5
 Power, Margaret (1953) Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende. 
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 56. 
2 
gender roles, rather than challenging them. For example, conservative values were 
strongly emphasized by the conservative party, and when women lent their support to the 
conservative party they were in essence supporting the value of limited rights for women 
in the workplace and in the public sphere. 
Salvador Allende became the first democratically elected Marxist president of 
Chile in 1970 running on a platform of nationalization and "radical" social reform. 
However, the three years of Allende's rule were wrought with tension. Running under a 
socialist platform oriented for the workers of Chile, Allende faced increasing distrust and 
alienation from the middle class and from the United States. The middle class came to 
view Allende and his government as a threat to Chilean society leading to demonstrations 
from the Chilean populous. 
Women featured prominently in the opposition to Allende. During the second 
presidential term of Allende, right- wing women's groups marched against the 
government of Allende. Women took to the streets of Chile on December 1, 1971 
ushering in the beginning of a "mass opposition movement." Most fascinating in regards 
to the large scale women's opposition movement was the ability of conservative leaders 
to "appeal" to women as both wives and mothers in the mobilization against Allende.6 By 
linking women's most prominent roles in society with the fight for democracy 
conservatives were able to bring about the downfall of Allende. The conservative party 
adopted the issues which were most important to women at the time; scarcity of food and 
defense of the country and advocated on the behalf of women. These were the issues that 
6
 Power, Margaret (1953) Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende. 
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 56. 
3 
struck at what it meant to be a woman in Chile at the time; a provider and a mother. 
Women were instrumental in the conservative led oppositional march coined the "March 
of Empty Pots and Pans." Women came to the streets in opposition to Allende and the 
scarcity of food he was creating for Chilean families. 
Conservatism continued to infiltrate Chilean society will into the 20th century as 
conservative values have long been emphasized and practiced in Chilean society. 
Conservative political elites prevented divorce from being legalized in Chile until 2004 
and abortion has yet to be legalized. The widespread Catholic presence in Chile delayed 
the legalization of divorce until 2004. Homosexuality and euthanasia are also not 
recognized as acceptable or lawful practices in Chilean society. 
Chilean women continued to be strong supporters of social conservatism well into 
the 21st century. Inglehart and Norris found utilizing survey data from the World Values 
Survey in 2002 that conservative values and a conservative ideology were widespread 
among Chilean women. Conservative values in Chile have historically been linked to an 
emphasis on familial ties, marriage, a high level of religiosity, and a belief that women 
should stay at home and have limited rights compared to men 7 
The Chilean case raises several interesting questions which will form the basis of 
this study. Seligson found that starting in 2006 Chilean citizens were starting to self-
identify to the left of the ideological spectrum. If Chileans, and more importantly Chilean 
women, identify to the left ideologically then it suggests social and ideological change is 
occurring in Chile. If this ideological change among women has indeed occurred, than 
support for conservative values may be replaced by support for liberal and democratic 
values as Seligson suggests. In the future, the practices of abortion, euthanasia, and 
7
 Oppenheim, Lois (1999) Politics in Chile. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 266-267. 
4 
homosexuality may eventually be legalized and women may assume a greater role in the 
realm of politics and formal employment. 
Overwhelming support for Bachelet in the 2006 presidential elections in Chile 
may provide further evidence of changes in ideology and values. It has been shown by 
Seligson that a leftist ideology in Chile is associated with support for democracy and 
support for civil liberties and rights. If Chileans and women have indeed shifted to the 
left, this is demonstrative of widespread support for democracy and the liberal values, 
associated with this form of government. This research may lead the Chilean government 
to take its role as a reformer and a provider of basic services more seriously Perhaps, by 
doing so, the ideological orientation of Chileans will further be affected translating into a 
favorable rating for democracy and democratic institutions 
This study asks two important questions which will form the basis for my 
research; are Chilean women joining the trend to the left, and if so why? As traditionally 
staunch conservatives, Chilean women's ideological orientation may not be so quick to 
change as in other Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia, where 
women have jumped on board the liberal bandwagon. If an ideological change has 
occurred among Chilean women - what demographics and attitudinal issues can account 
for it? 
This research contributes to the understanding of ideology in Latin America and 
the causal mechanisms of women's ideological orientation. Other studies have 
investigated gender difference in partisanship, vote choice, and even ideology in the 
United States and Latin America. However, this research examines the demographic 
factors and attitudinal issues that determine the ideological orientation of Chilean women. 
5 
The foundation for this research is a similar study conducted by Norrander and Wilcox 
in the U.S. Norrander and Wilcox examined the demographic and attitudinal issues 
which accounted for the shift to the left among a segment of women. Recently, an 
ideological change in self-identification has occurred in Latin America, this research will 
discuss the extent of which this trend has affected Chilean women and the correlation 
between ideological orientation, demographics, and women's attitudes toward social 
issues and government intervention. 
This thesis relies upon statistical analysis to interpret 2006 LAPOP survey data. 
The Latin America Public Opinion Project is an independent survey of the citizens of 
Latin America and their political values conducted by Vanderbilt University under the 
general guidance of director Mitchell Seligson.8 This survey was conducted as part of the 
LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2006.9 The 2006 survey of Chileans was designed by 
Vanderbilt University in conjunction with the Institute de Ciencias Politicas of the 
Pontifica Universidad Catolica de Chile.10 The study consists of 1,517 completed 
surveys, 835 of which were completed by men, and 682 by women.11 A national 
probability design was used and the margin of error for the sample was +-2.57.n 
8
 The Latin America Public Opinion Project (www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop). THE 2006 LATIN AMERICA 









 Seligson, Mitchell (2007) "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America," The Democracy 
Barometers, vol. 18 no. 4: 87-95. 
16
 Seligson 2007 
17
 Seligson 2007 
6 
Respondents were drawn from the voting age population, and a quota system based on 
sex and age was established to select respondents.13 Funding for this study was supplied 
by the Instituto de Ciencias Politicas of the Pontifica Universidad Catolica de Chile.14 
Survey data are useful for understanding social demographics, women's attitudes 
toward government intervention programs, and women's attitudes toward social issues. 
These data enhance the external validity of the research. Survey design is useful in this 
study for making predictions about women's attitudes toward government intervention 
and social issues. Even though survey design is not without limitations, it is the most 
appropriate research design to be used in this study. This research will add to the existing 
literature of ideology and gender by looking at the influence women's attitudes toward 
social issues and government intervention have on the ideological orientation of Chilean 
women, 
Is there a Gender Gap in Chile? 
Ideological orientation has recently become the focal point of several studies of 
Latin American political behavior. Seligson examined the ideological orientation of 
Latin American citizens and the relationship of ideology to support for democracy and 
democratic institutions. Seligson argued that for an ideological shift to matter it must 
translate into voting behavior and party preferences.15 Seligson analyzed survey data 
from the World Values Survey and the AmericasBarometer questionnaire asking 
respondents to self-position themselves on an ideological scale from 1 (extremely 
18
 Power, Margaret (1953) Eight-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende. 
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 56. 
7 
conservative) to 10 (extremely liberal). He concluded that in many socially conservative 
countries, including Chile, citizens had shifted to the left ideologically but the magnitude 
of the shift is small.17 This regional shift to the left has put a spotlight on Chile a country 
known for its longstanding social conservatism. 
Chilean women have historically been linked to conservative issues and parties 
Chilean women's historic identification with the conservative party is evidence of 
women's conservatism in Chile. 
Although Chilean women were not granted the right to vote until 1935, in 1917 
the Conservative Party in Chile called for a law to be passed extending the right to vote to 
Chilean women.18 This "sponsorship" of a voting law in Chile by the Right is but one 
example where conservative parties have advocated on the behalf of women in order to 
increase the "support for the Conservative party" while simultaneously "expanding the 
support" for traditional gender roles 19 
Another piece of evidence for women's conservatism in Chile is Chilean 
women's prominent role in the overthrow of Allende. During the turbulent years of the 
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overthrow of the Unidad Popular.20 Ideological orientation has long been contentious in 
Chile, as ideological polarization ushered in the demise of democracy under Allende in 
1973 and gave rise to the 17 year Pinochet dictatorship. Women featured prominently in 
these ideological battles, as women's protests for and against democracy were important 
in overthrowing Allende's Popular Unity government. 
The most famous march led by right-wing women against the government of 
Allende was appropriately called the March of the Empty Pots and Pans. Well to do 
women took to the streets of Chile on December 1, 1971 ushering in the beginning of a 
"mass opposition movement."21 These women were opposed to Allende's economic 
policy which was creating a scarcity of food by raising worker's salaries.22 Interestingly 
enough, this large scale women's protest, constituted the first "mass mobilization" 
against the Unidad Populare.23 Conservative women fed up with the burdensome 
economic crisis took charge in "catalyzing" political opposition to Allende.24 
Scholars attribute the demise and "forcible dismantalization" of Allende to the 
work of oppositional women's groups. 25The issues weighing heavily on women's 
support for conservatism during the 1970s were an inability to provide basic resources for 
their children due to a scarcity of food and public disorder/violence.26 Most fascinating in 
regards to the large scale women's opposition movement was the ability of conservative 
leaders in the Christian Democratic Party and the National Party to "appeal" to women as 
30
 Power 1953 
31
 Power 1953 
9 
both wives and mothers in the mobilization against Allende. By linking women's most 
prominent roles in society with the fight for the overthrow of democracy, conservatives 
were able to bring about the downfall of Allende. Women became drawn to the principles 
and philosophy behind the Conservative Party.28 The doctrine of the Church, which 
women looked to for spiritual guidance, was embodied in the message of conservatism. 
Furthermore, the parties of the Right promised to pursue policies that would benefit 
women and their families. Conservative leaders played upon the "rage and frustration" 
many women felt as a result of the food shortages and lack of security to mobilize women 
against Allende. 30 Women believed that stability and security could only be achieved 
when there was a complete military overthrow of Allende.31 
Stern illuminates the reasons women identified with conservatism in a series of 
qualitative interviews with Chilean women conducted after the military dictator Pinochet 
came to power. After the demise of Allende, women became prominent supporters of 
Pinochet and his conservative party which successfully overthrew Allende. Even after 
Pinochet was accused of crimes and human rights abuses committed during his seventeen 
year rule, conservative women continued to support the Chilean military dictator.32 Some 
women even denied that human rights abuses had occurred. Stem poignantly captures the 
perspective of Chilean women who supported the takeover of Chile by the military 
3ZPowerl953 
33




 Stern 2004 
10 
backed Pinochet. Many people including Dona Elena saw Pinochet as a "hero." For her 
and many like Elana the overthrow of Allende saved her family and "set Chile on the 
road to good health." 34In the mind of Dona Elena the cost of Pinochet was less than the 
cost to Chilean society if Allende had remained in power.35 Dona Elena remembered the 
transition of power from President Frei to Allende as one of upheaval and violence. 
Property was seized and the government took over industries. For Dona Elena, President 
Allende was "too frivolous and irresponsible to control those on the Left who did 
advocate and organize violence."36 For many, Allende for many represented the turmoil 
and violence to conservative Chilean society. Stem notes that "the world of conservative 
middle-class and Catholic morality, as well as conservative arrangements of property fell 
apart in the 1960s and 1970s," and for women like Dona Elena this happened because of 
Allende and his socialist ideals. 37 
Even well into the 20th century, perhaps one of the most surprising consequences 
of democratization and modernization of Chilean society was the maintenance of 
"traditional, conservative, classist, and sexist" values.38 Even as Chile experienced record 
economic growth, the underlying conservative values were still present.39 Efforts to 
37Stern2004 
38
 Oppenheim, Lois (1999) Politics in Chile. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 266-267. 
39
 Oppenheim 1999 
40
 Oppenheim 1999 
41Powef, Margaret (1953) Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende. 
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 261-263. 
42





legalize divorce and liberalize abortion laws were met with great resistance from the 
legislature and the right-wing dominated media.40 Machismo was also still "pervasive," 
and gender barriers prevented many women from leaving their homes.41 
On January 16, 2000 Richard Lagos was elected president of Chile after securing 
a majority of votes from Chilean men.42 Chilean women voted for the candidate to the 
Right of the ideological spectrum, Joaquin Lavin for the same reasons that they supported 
the overthrow of Allende. Just as in the 1970s, the Right continued to appeal to women 
because Lavin "spoke directly to their primary concerns and promised that he would 
solve their most urgent problems."43 The issues which motivated women in their 
identification as conservatives were once again related to the family, security, and their 
roles as wives and mothers.44 Lavin promised to create new jobs, improve schools, help 
the elderly, and crack down on the high crime rate which instilled fear in many Chilean 
women.45 Women were drawn to his rhetoric of making it easier for women to work and 
have a family. Just as in 1970, the Right did a better job than the Left in creating a 
program centered around women and the issues important to them.46 The Left, just as 
^PowerlPSS 
47
 Power 1953 
48
 The LAPOP name for this variable is CHI2. The exact wording of the political ideology question is, 
"Otra forma de situarse politicamente es utilizando los conceptos de conservador o liberal. En una escala de 
1 a 10, donde 1 significa que usted es totalmente "conservador" y 10 que usted es totalmente "liberal, i en 
que" lugar situaria usted?" On the ideological scale where 1 is extremely conservative and 10 is extremely 
liberal where do you position yourself?. The exact wording of the gender question is "Genero: (l)hombre 
(2)mujer." Gender: (1) male (2) female. The variable in this study was recoded (0) male and (1) female 
12 
under Allende, "failed to" create a program that "dealt with the realities and aspirations 
of Chilean women. 47 
How do Chilean women orient themselves ideologically today? Despite the long 
standing historical relationship between Chilean women and conservatism, Chileans are 
starting to self-identify to the left ideologically. Seligson finds that despite the magnitude 
of the ideological shift to the left being small it is nonetheless present among Chilean 
voters. Now we must determine if Chilean women are joining this trend or if they are 
continuing to follow the historical pull of social conservatism. In this research the 
ideological orientation of respondents refers to the degree to which Chileans self-position 
themselves on an ideological scale. Ideological orientation is operationalized by a 2006 
LAPOP survey question asking respondents to self-position themselves on an ideological 
scale ranging from (1) extremely conservative to (10) extremely liberal.48Gender refers to 
the sex of the respondent. Gender is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question 
recording respondent's gender. 
Figure 1 indicates that 22% of Chilean men self- position themselves as a 5 or 
somewhere in between an extremely liberal and extremely conservative ideological 
orientation. Likewise, 21.4% of Chilean women self-positioned themselves on the 
ideological scale at greater than 5, or liberal. 
49
 An Independent Samples t Test determined the significance of this result, indicating that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the mean ideological position of men and the mean ideological 
position ofwomen at the .001 level. 
13 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Self-placement on the ideological scale where 1 is 
extremely conservative and ID is extremely liberal 
Figure 2 indicates that overall, out of 791 male respondents, the average 
ideological position is 5.94. Out of 660 female respondents, the average ideological 
position is 5.21. There is a small but statistically significant difference between the two.49 
While women historically have been more conservative than men, by 2006 the 
differences between men and women were slight. Indeed, on average women were 
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To understand the reasons for the ideological orientation of Chilean women, this 
paper is organized into six subsequent chapters. I begin chapter two by establishing a 
theoretical framework explaining the ideological shift to the left among Chilean women. 
The first part of this framework explores studies that address the impact demographic 
factors have on the ideological orientations of men and women. The second part explores 
studies that address the impact attitudinal variables have had and continue to have on the 
ideological orientations of men and women. 
15 
Chapter three will focus on demographic variables and their relation to the 
ideological orientation of Chilean women. Chapter four will examine women's attitudes 
toward the social policies of divorce, euthanasia, abortion, and homosexuality and their 
relationship to women's ideological preferences. Chapter five will focus on women's 
attitudes toward government issues and their relationship toward women's ideology. 
Using multivariate regression analysis, chapter six will analyze survey/attitudinal data in 
Chile related to social issues, social demographics, and government intervention. This 
analysis will show how changes in women's attitudes toward social policy and 
government intervention, has led to a slight ideological shift to the left among Chilean 




What factors account for Chilean women's liberal ideological orientation? 
According to Powers, the scarcity of food and personal security were the two pressing 
issues which factored into women's support for a conservative opposition movement 
against Allende.50 The literature review that follows uses the literature conducted on 
women's ideological orientation in the US to identify additional factors that may explain 
Chilean women's ideological orientation, particularly potential structural and attitudinal 
variables. 
This research relies on several theoretical approaches to explain the ideological 
orientation of Chilean women A structural/ demographic approach examines the effect 
variables related to the structural characteristics of a population have on the ideological 
orientation of citizens. Commonly used demographic variables in social science research 
are age, race, educational attainment, and income level. An attitudinal approach in this 
research examines the effect a population or group's values, beliefs, and opinions of 
certain subjects have on the ideological preferences of citizens. 
Structural Approach 
The structuralism approach seeks to establish relationships between demographic 
variables and ideological orientation. Brooks and Manza explored differences between 
men and women in the US through a quantitative study of different structural theories. 
They use structural theories to explain gender differences in the voting behavior of both 
50Power, Margaret (1953) Right- Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende. 
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 261-263. 
17 
men and women in U.S. presidential elections. Even though their dependent variable is 
distinct, their analysis still illuminates the potential importance of structural factors in 
explaining ideology. Their study relied upon data collected from the National Election 
Survey, which produces data on voting, public opinion, and political participation in the 
United States during the presidential election years of 1952 to 1992.51 
The structural/demographic approach they utilized points to four key factors 
important in understanding the gender gap in voting. The first was an increase in 
women's autonomy. The logic behind this theory was that married women have a 
different voting behavior than divorced or single women who possess more autonomy 
and independence than their married counterparts.52 In support of this theory, Carroll 
found evidence for the argument that the gender gap in the 1980 election can be 
attributed to the increasing number of unmarried women who remain independent from a 
husband. 53This research has important implications for this study because the growing 
autonomy of women in Chile and the availability of divorce as ah option for women to 
gain independence from their husbands may be prominent factors in the liberal 
orientation of Chilean women. 
The second factor in this study was socialization. The logic behind this factor was 
that differences in the patterns of socialization for both men and women caused them to 
51
 Manza, Jeff, and Clem Brooks (1998) "The Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential Elections: When? Why? 
Implications?" The American Journal of Sociology vol. 103 :.1239-1245 
52
 Manza and Brooks 1998 
53
 Carroll, Susan (1988) "Women's Autonomy and the Gender Gap: 1980 and 1982" The Politics of the 
Gender Gap, Sage: 236-257. 
18 
hold different political beliefs, core values, and behavior.54 Some theorists such as 
Gilligan argued that childhood socialization was most important in determining the 
political values of men and women as adults.55 In contrast, others, such as Sapiro argue 
that women's connection to their role as mothers has important implications in their 
political preferences and vote choice.56 Women may view the Democratic Party more 
favorably because of the value the party places on providing for the general welfare of 
families. Their research has important implications for this study because it discusses 
how the values and beliefs of either political elites or parties can strongly influence voter 
choice. The same applies to the case of Chilean women throughout history whose 
ideological preferences were shaped by conservative elites who appealed to women's 
roles as mothers. 
The third factor in this research was a rise in feminist consciousness. Brooks and 
Manza believed that women who were more likely to identify themselves with the 
women's movement were thus more likely to vote Democratic.57 In agreement Conover 
found in a 1988 study that gender differences in voter choice among men and women is 
due to rising feminist identities among women.58 Likewise, Cook in her article finds that 
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feminists have traditionally been more supportive of Democratic candidates in the 1972, 
1984, and 1988 elections 59 
The fourth factor looked at an increase in women's employment. This theory 
predicted that women who were employed in the labor force would be more likely to vote 
Democratic.60 However, the "political significance" of women's participation in the work 
force remains controversial.61 Andersen and Cook argued that women's employment did 
not influence political values.62 Likewise, Plutzer and Deitch found that other 
sociodemographic variables had a much greater effect on the gender gap.63 
Brooks and Manza concluded that the gender gap in voting behavior was best 
explained by the increase in the number of women who were employed.64 The increase in 
the number of women employed resulted in a shift among women toward support for 
Democratic presidential candidates. There was little to no statistical evidence indicating a 
relationship between women's autonomy and socialization processes with the emerging 
gender gap.65 Likewise, the theory suggesting that women were more likely to vote 
Democratic as result of the support for the women's movement was not found to be 
60
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significant. This research implies that the demographic variable of women's employment 
is a prominent reason for the gender gap in voting choice. Brooks and Manza were unable 
to rule out attitudinal changes in regards to women's participation in the labor force as 
being responsible for the emerging gender gap in vote choice. Brooks and Manza's 
finding are important to this research because it starts the examination of potential 
demographic factors that influence a gender gap, while also recognizing that attitudinal 
variables may be significant factors. This research, however, fails to provide knowledge 
regarding the demographic variables which predict the ideological preferences of 
women. 
Structural/Demographic and Attitudinal Approach 
Like Brooks and Manza, Inglehart and Norris also focused on the importance of 
demographic/ structural variables in their study. However, Inglehart and Norris expanded 
upon previous gender gap studies in vote choice, issues, and partisanship in their 2002 
study by examining the gender gap in ideology, and public opinion in various world 
regions.66 
Inglehart and Norris argued that women who were once more likely to self-
identify as conservative in post-industrial societies were now more likely to identify as 
liberal.67The theory utilized to explain this phenomenon was accurately coined gender 
realignment. Norris and Inglehart argued that in post-industrial societies a modern gender 
gap where women held more left leaning values than men had replaced the traditional 
gender gap. The cause of this gender realignment in the United States was thought to be 
67
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an interaction between a shift in cultural values and new structural developments (the 
employment of women, educational advancement of women, and decrease in religiosity) 
that have "reshaped" political values.68 
Essentially, what these social scientists argued was that changes in the lives of 
women in post-industrial societies had led to changes in ideological preferences. This 
research has important implications for this study because it discusses how a combination 
of structural and cultural changes may lead to changes in the ideological preferences of 
women. 
Utilizing data from the World Values Survey during 1995-2002 Inglehart and 
Norris concluded that women hold more left-leaning values than men in regards to the 
appropriate role of the state versus the market, and government role in social protection 
and public ownership.69 Women were more likely than men to hold left leaning values in 
the areas of support for an active role of government in social protection and public 
ownership of business, and in support for political issues.70 They found that women were 
more liberal than men due to a more influential set of attitudinal variables. While 
Inglehart and Norris recognized that a rise in feminist consciousness, an increase in 
women's autonomy, and women's increasing participation in the labor force were 
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important factors in explaining the gender gap, it was the shift in cultural values that 
featured more prominently in women's changing ideological orientation. Inglehart and 
Norris' findings are important to this research because it highlights how influential 
women's attitudes toward the economy specifically in terms of government intervention 
are in determining the ideological preferences of women. Attitudinal factors are not only 
important determinants of the ideological orientation of women but also in explaining 
why women are more liberal than men. 
Recently, and most applicable to this research, is a 2007 U.S. study conducted by 
Norrander and Wilcox which examined the presence of a gender gap in ideological self-
identification in the U.S. In this research, Norrander and Wilcox examined the effect 
specific demographic variables and attitudinal variables had on the ideological gender 
gap. While existing studies such as the studies by Inglehart and Norris, and Brooks and 
Manza, account for the gender gap in partisanship, vote choice, and issues, "far less 
attention" has been paid to the impact social issues and attitudinal values have on gender 
differences in ideology.71 A few scholars have confirmed the existence of an ideological 
gender gap but little exists in the way of an actual explanation for its existence. 
Likewise, whereas Inglehart and Norris have noted the increasing liberal 
identification of American women as accounting for gender difference between men and 
women, few studies have tried to explain what accounts for this gender gap. Norrander 
and Wilcox, argue that ideological identification helps "organize" people's political 
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worlds. For some, an ideological identity is the foundation from which people formulate 
their values and make political judgments.73 And for others, an ideological orientation 
shapes their voting choice and political beliefs.74 The election of Chilean president 
Bachelet may be indicative of changing ideological preferences resulting in changes in 
partisan preferences Those studies that have examined ideological identification have 
suggested that women's conservative leaning in the past was due to their greater religious 
adherence.75 Now, as women become more secular they have also become more liberal. 
This may be the case in Chile where examples of secularization such as the legalization 
of a divorce law are indicative of a weakening influence of the Catholic Church on the 
ideological orientation of Chilean women. 
Norrander and Wilcox conceptualize ideological identity as an identity that both 
causes and is a consequence of specific issue positions. These social scientists make three 
concrete arguments while also acknowledging that the gender gap has reversed from the 
1950s when men were more liberal than women. They argue that the liberal leanings of 
American women, and the conservative stance of American men, arise from differences 
in issue positions and policy preferences between men and women.76 Specifically, 
Kauffman and Petrocik attribute the growing gender gap in ideological preferences to 
attitudes toward the role of government in the creation of social policy. This may be but 
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one set of attitudinal variables that have been influential in the slight shift to the centre 
left of Chilean women. 
Second, Norrander and Wilcox argue that the gender gap in ideological self-
identification is due to differences between men and women in the issues that shaped 
their ideological identities.77 Instead of different views on the same issue accounting for 
the ideological gender gap, Norrander and Wilcox hypothesized that a different set of 
issues for men and women may be more important in determining what ideological 
identity they acquire. Previous studies by Gilens and Kaufmann have suggested that men 
and women differ in what issues they consider to be important and this strongly 
determines their partisan preferences.78 Kauffman argued that for women gender-specific 
issues such as reproduction rights, gender equality, and equal rights were central to the 
partisanship choices of women, whereas for men social welfare issues were more 
important.79 This argument has implications for this study because a certain set of social 
or economic issues may account for women's slight shift to the centre-left. 
Third, Norrander and Wilcox hypothesized that a gender gap in ideological self-
identification may be caused by a group of men changing their ideological self-
identification while a similar group of women have not or vice versa.80 The gender gap 
in ideological orientation among Chilean women may then be the result of a combination 
of demographic and attitudinal variables that have caused women to shift more centre-left 
79
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than men. These arguments are applicable to the study of the ideological orientation of 
women in Chile because they stress the importance of attitudinal variables as important 
factors in the ideological preferences of women. 
The data utilized in Norrander and Wilcox study was from the American 
National Election Study's ideological self-placement scale beginning with the 1972 
survey through 2006.81 The seven point ideological scale utilized in this study ranged 
from 1-7. The variable was coded 1 for an extreme liberal identification and 10 for an 
extreme conservative identification. First, Norrander and Wilcox looked at historical 
trends in gender differences in ideological orientation. They accomplished this by noting 
the average placement of men and women who identify themselves as liberals, 
moderates, and conservatives.82 On average, both men and women had a mean 
ideological position above 4.0 indicating a slight conservative leaning. Similar to the 
measurement utilized by Inglehart and Norris, the gender gap was measured by 
subtracting women's mean ideological position from men's mean ideological position. A 
positive gap score indicated that women were more likely than men to self-identify as 
liberal. Between 1992 and 2004, the gender gap averaged .24 and was significant.83 It is 
interesting to note that the gender gap did not emerge because women as a whole have 
become more liberal.84 
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After determining the means, they then analyzed the percentages of men and 
women who identified in each of the three ideological categories. In contrast to the study 
conducted by Inglehart and Norris, Norrander and Wilcox found that both men and 
women have become more conservative over time, but that a group of women defined be 
being college educated and unmarried have become more liberal. The surveys indicated 
that men on average have become much more conservative than women thereby 
accounting for the gender gap.85 An analysis of the percentages of men and women who 
identify as liberals, conservatives, and moderates showed a somewhat conflicting trend 
This analysis suggested that both men and women identified themselves as conservatives, 
but that women at the beginning of the time series were 8 percentage points less likely 
than men to self-identify as conservative.86 Likewise, over time women were more likely 
to identify themselves as liberal while men were not. Taking the conflicting results into 
account, Norrander and Wilcox concluded that an examination of the average mean 
ideological position of men and women "masked" the "dual trajectory of women." 87 
Analyzing the percentages showed that a segment of women were more likely to identify 
themselves as liberal even as both men and women increasingly adopted conservative 
90
 Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," Journal of Political 
Behavior, Springer. 
91
 Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
92
 Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
93
 Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
94
 Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
95
 Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
96
 Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
97
 Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
98
 Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
99
 Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
100
 Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
101
 Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
27 
ideological self-placements. Thus, while men were increasingly becoming more 
conservative, women as a group were experiencing an "ideological divide."88 
Explanations for gender differences in individual self-placements on the ideological scale 
were then measured examining a multitude of demographic and issue attitudinal 
variables, which are important to this study. " Norrander and Wilcox focused on the 
impact of "economic locations" such as income and union membership. They also looked 
at new "cultural cleavages" such as education, marital status, religiosity, and evangelical 
denominations on ideological self-identification while holding constant demographic 
variables such as race, age, and region. 90 To examine which groups of Americans were 
changing their ideology, they tested the relationship between demographic variables and 
the seven point ideological scale.91 They found that employment and union membership 
had different effects for men versus women. Men who were employed were more likely 
to have conservative leanings while women who were employed were more likely to 
have liberal leanings.92 Men who were members of a union were more likely to identify 
themselves as liberal.93 Income had become a less significant predictor of men's ideology 
and was not significant for women. Race was not a significant predictor of ideology for 
either men or women but religiosity (measured by asking respondents how frequently 
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they attended church) was a significant predictor of a conservative identity for both 
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sexes. 
Interestingly, some variables were found to be more important over time for 
either men or for women in predicting their ideological self-placement For women 
education increasingly became a significant predictor of ideology.95 Norrander and 
Wilcox found that college educated women were more likely to self-identify as liberal. 
Likewise, they concluded that as a result of the increase in the number of college 
educated women, women as a group had become slightly more liberal over 
time.96Married women and married men were more likely to be conservative than 
unmarried women and unmarried men.97 These results indicated that marriage was a 
significant factor in explaining women's ideological position. For men, income and 
employment had decreased in significance over time and were no longer linked to men's 
ideological self-placement.98 However, an increase in the number of women who held 
college degrees, and an increase in the number of unmarried women, resulted in both 
groups being more likely than other women to self-identify as liberal.99 Thus, Norrander 
and Wilcox concluded that college educated and unmarried women were the segments of 
women responsible for producing gender differences between men and women in 
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ideological self-identification. Changes in the level of education and in the marital 
status of women had led to changes in women's self-identification. 101 
After determining which groups of men and women were responsible for the 
gender gap in ideological self-identification, Norrander and Wilcox then explored the 
potential reasons for changes in women's ideological self-identification. The focus of 
their study was on the political issues related to ideological orientation that may differ for 
men and for women. In their study, Norrander and Wilcox made reference to past 
research that has suggested social welfare issues are paramount for men in determining 
their vote choice and partisanship, while cultural issues such as support for feminism, 
religion, abortion rights, and gay and lesbian rights are more important determinants for 
women.102 To test the relationship between ideological self-identification and these 
issues, Norrander and Wilcox utilized ANES surveys beginning in 1980. The five issues 
that they chose to analyze were social welfare (government guarantee of jobs), civil rights 
(aid to Blacks), the role of women in society, moral issues (abortion) and defense issues. 
To examine the relationship between religion and ideological self-identification they 
included a measure of evangelical religious doctrine. 
Not surprisingly, given the "salience" of the issue, Norrander and Wilcox found 
that women's and men's attitudes on abortion were significant predictors of ideological 
self-identification.103 Women and men who were pro-choice were more likely to identify 
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themselves as liberal whereas women and men who were pro-life were more likely to 
identify themselves as conservative104 Similarly, women's role in society was also a 
significant predictor of both men's and women's ideology. Past research indicating that 
women and men who followed traditional gender roles were more likely to be 
conservative supported these findings. 105 Norrander and Wilcox also found that over 
time attitudes on social welfare issues such as government provision of jobs was 
becoming a less significant predictor of ideological orientation overtime for both men and 
women.106 However, it was still an influential factor in predicting men's ideological self-
identification. Following Evangelical religious doctrine was a significant predictor of 
both men's and women's ideological self-identification. Men and women who followed 
religious doctrine were more likely to be conservative. 
Norrander and Wilcox concluded that a gender gap between men and women was 
the result of a growing segment of women self-identifying as liberal even as both men 
and women were increasingly becoming more conservative.107 Men's increasing 
conservatism over time was the result of the decreasing significance of income on 
ideological self-identification.108 Over time both poor and wealthy men self-identified as 
conservative/Between income brackets there was no significant difference in ideological 
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self-identification. Norrander and Wilcox also determined that in the case of women, 
an increase in the number of college educated women and an increase in the number of 
women who were single had resulted in an increase in the number of women who self-
identified as liberal.110 Even though higher education levels and a single status had 
always predicted a more liberal self-identification among women, changes in both 
demographics had resulted in a larger number of liberal women.111 
Norrander and Wilcox also concluded that religion remains a very important 
predictor of ideological identification, while attitudes toward abortion and women's role 
in society became significant predictors of ideological self-identification for both men 
and women overtime.112 Therefore, attitudes on political issues were significantly related 
to both women's and men's ideological self-identification. This research has important 
implications for this study because it explores attitudinal and demographic factors that are 
significant predictors of the ideological orientation of women This research provides a 
basis from which to determine whether Chilean women have followed a similar trajectory 
to women in the United States. A liberal orientation among Chilean women may be the 
result of similar demographic and attitudinal factors found to be significant in their study. 
This research will begin by examining the influence of demographic factors and 
attitudinal factors on the liberal orientation of Chilean women. This research will argue 
that a combination of demographic and attitudinal factors have influenced the ideological 
orientation of Chilean women. 
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CHAPTER m 
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHICS ON WOMEN'S IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIENTATION 
This chapter explores the relationship between the demographic variables of age, 
education, marital status, income, and religiosity and women's ideological orientation. 
When testing the significance of the relationship between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable, only women were selected for the analysis. In this research the 
ideological orientation of women refers to the degree to which Chilean women self-
position themselves on an ideological scale Ideological orientation is operationalized by 
a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents to self-position themselves on an 
ideological scale ranging from (1) extremely conservative to (10) extremely liberal 
Age 
Norrander and Wilcox suggested in their study that older women in the United 
States were more likely than younger women to identify as conservative.113 Inglehart and 
Norris attributed the gender realignment among women in the U.S. to the process of 
modernization and its effect on value and lifestyle change.114 Specific to Chile, Seligson 
found that older Chileans are actually less likely to identify with leftist regimes than in 
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values, so it is not surprising that older traditional Chileans are more supportive of 
conservative regimes and conservative values. In Chile, older women who had protested 
under Allende, might be more conservative than those who had not grown up under the 
tumultuous Allende years. 
In this study age refers to the age in years of women. Age is operationalized by a 
2006 LAPOP survey question asking women what their age in years is. u 6 I hypothesize 
that as the age of women increases, ideology will become more conservative. The null 
hypothesis in this study is that there is no relationship between the age of Chilean women 
and their ideological orientation. 
Overall, the average age of women respondents in the LAPOP survey was 44 
years of age. To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the age of 
women and their ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation 
test between women's age and ideological orientation. Figure 3 suggests that at the 
bivariate level there is a relationship between women's age and ideological orientation 
and this relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as 
the age of women increases, they become less liberal 
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Figure 3: The Effect of Age on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean Women 
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 
18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 83 85 89 
Age in years 
A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates the relationship between age and 
the ideological orientation of Chilean women. The Pearson's correlation coefficient (r= -
.218) indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship at the .001 level between 
the age of Chilean women and their ideological orientation. As the age of Chilean women 
increases, they become less liberal. The null hypothesis can therefore be rejected. In 
support of Seligson's finding, this analysis finds that younger women in Chile are more 
likely to self-identify as liberal and espouse civil liberties and liberal values. Older 
women in Chile are more likely to espouse conservative traditional values. 
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Marital Status 
The research by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that in the United States 
married women were more likely than non-married women to self-identify as 
conservative.117 Inglehart and Norris also found that married women were more likely to 
self-identify as conservative.118 Married women have different interests and lifestyles 
than their non-married counterparts, and these differences are reflected in self-
perception.119 In this study marital status of women refers to the civil status of women. 
Marital status is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents 
whether they are single, married, widowed, divorced, civil union, or separated.120 Marital 
status is coded (1) single, (2) married, (3) civil union, (4) divorced, (5) separated, and (6) 
widowed.121 
The second hypothesis in this study predicts that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the mean ideological orientation between married women and women who 
are single or in a partnership. Married women will be less likely than single women to be 
liberal. Overall, in the LAPOP survey the majority or 55% of Chilean women 
respondents were married and 45% were not.121 To test the null hypothesis that there is 
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no statistically significant difference in the mean ideological orientation between married 
women and single women, an Independent Samples t Test will be conducted. Figure 4 
suggests there is a relationship between women's marital status and ideological 
orientation, married women are significantly less likely than single women to be liberal. 
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Marital status 
Thos women who are married had ideological scores closer to the conservative 
end of the spectrum. The difference between the mean ideological position for married 
women and the mean ideological position for single women is .73. An Independent 
Samples t Test will determine the significance of this result. The Independent Samples t 
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Test shows that there is a significant difference between the ideological position of single 
women and the ideological position of married women at the .001 level. The significance 
statistic of .000 is much less than .001. Therefore, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the mean ideological position of single women and married women 
and the null hypothesis can therefore be rejected. Single women are significantly more 
likely than married women to be liberal. 
Religion 
The research by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that in the United States 
religious women and men were more likely than non-religious women and men to 
identify as conservative.122 Inglehart and Norris also found that religious belief was 
associated with traditional values and identification with a conservative ideology123 
Historically in Chile the Catholic religion has permeated all aspects of life in Chile. The 
strong opposition to the legalization of divorce by the Catholic Church has featured 
prominently in delaying reform of existing social laws in Chilean society. In this research 
religion refers to the religious denomination of respondents. Religion is operationalized 
by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking women what their religious denomination is. 
Respondents are given the choice of selecting (1) Catholic^ (2) Christian, (3) Other than 
Christian, (5) Evangelical, (6) Jewish, and (4) nothing.124 
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The third hypothesis in this study predicts that there will be a statistically 
significant difference in the mean ideological orientation of women who adhere to a 
religious denomination and those who do not. Women who belong to a religion will be 
less liberal than women who do not. Overall, the majority of Chilean women respondents 
in the LAPOP survey, or 70% are Catholic.125 To test the null hypothesis that there is no 
statistically significant difference in the mean ideological orientation of women who 
belong to a religious denomination and those who do not, this research will utilize an 
Independent Samples t Test between religion and women's ideological orientation. 
Figure 5 suggests there is a relationship between women's religious denomination and 
ideological orientation and this relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the 
research hypothesis, women who identify with a religious denomination will'be Jess, 
liberal. 
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Religion 
Women not belonging to a religion had ideological scores closer to the liberal end 
of the spectrum. The difference between the mean ideological position for women who 
belong in a religious denomination and the mean ideological position for women who do 
not is .86. The Independent Samples t Test shows that there is a significant difference 
between the ideological position of women who belong to a religious denomination and 
the ideological position of women who do not (p< .05). Therefore, there is a statistically 
significant difference between the mean ideological position of women who do and do 
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not belong to a religious denomination and the null hypothesis can therefore be rejected. 
Women who do not belong to a religious denomination are significantly more likely than 
women who do belong to a religious denomination to be liberal. In support of Norrander 
and Wilcox finding, this analysis finds that Catholic women and Evangelical women are 
more likely to self-identify as conservative, while women who do not belong to a 
religious denomination are more likely to be liberal 126 
Income 
The research by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that in the United States income 
was not a significant predictor of women's ideological orientation over time. In 
contrast, Inglehart and Norris found that while past research pointed to socioeconomic 
status being an insignificant predictor of gender differences in voting between men and 
women, middle class women were more likely than other income groups to self-identify 
• 128 
as conservative. 
In this research income refers to the range of income a family makes. Income is 
operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents their family 
126
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de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiars mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las 
remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?" 
130LAPOP dataset Chile 2006. 
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income range. Income is coded (1) less than 40.000 pesos to (10) more than 980.000 
pesos. 13° For comparison there are 13 pesos for every U.S. dollar 
The fourth hypothesis in this study predicts that as the income level of women 
increases they will be less liberal. Overall, the majority of Chilean women respondents in 
the LAPOP survey, or 26% fall into a lower middle income bracket of 109 to 190 pesos. 
To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the income level of 
women and their ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation 
test between income level and ideological orientation. 
The Pearson's r coefficient of .045 was not significant, indicating that there is not 
a significant relationship between income level and women's ideological orientation. 
Figure 6 further confirmed this trend. The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected. 
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Figure 6: The Effect of Income on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean Women 
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Income range In pesos 
Interviewer response effects such as social desirability may be why no significant 
correlation was found between income level and the ideological orientation of Chilean 
women. The lack of a relationship may also be due to other factors being more influential 
than income in explaining Chilean women's liberal orientation. Income may not factor in 
to women's decision to become ideologically liberal. 
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Educational Attainment 
The research conducted by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that education level 
was a significant predictor of the ideological orientation of women in the U.S.131 Women 
with a college education were more likely than less educated women and men to self-
identify as liberal. 132Inglehart and Norris also found that the entry of women into higher 
education had a significant effect on their political values and priorities.133 Numerous 
public opinion studies have indicated education is "consistently linked" with more liberal 
attitudes.134 In this research the level of educational attainment of women refers to the 
highest level of education obtained by women. Level of educational attainment is 
operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents what their highest 
level of educational attainment is by grade. Respondent's Education level is arranged as 
an ordinal scale by primary school (grades 1-8), secondary school (grades 9-12), 
university level (grades 13-17), higher non- university/technical level (11-13), and no 
education.135 The fifth hypothesis in this study predicts that as the number of years spent 
in school increases, women will be more liberal. Overall, the average number of school 
years for Chilean women was 10th grade, or second year of high school. The highest 
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number of school years achieved by the majority of women was 12th grade, or completion 
of high school. 
To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the number of 
school years and women's ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's 
correlation test between school year and women's ideological orientation. Figure 7 
suggests there is a relationship between school year and women's ideological orientation 
and this relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as 
the number of years spent in school increases, women are more liberal. 




A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's r 
coefficient of. 114 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .01 level between 
school years and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. As the number of years 
spent in school increases, Chilean women are more liberal. 
This study will shift to a focus of attitudinal variables and their relationship to the 
ideological orientation of Chilean women. Women's attitudes toward the social issues of 
divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality, and abortion will be explored as potential factors in 
the liberal orientation of Chilean women. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFECT OF WOMEN'S ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL ISSUES ON 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION 
It has already been established which demographic variables have a significant 
effect or relationship on the ideological orientation of Chilean women at the bivariate 
level In this chapter the relationship between women's attitudes toward social issues and 
women's ideological orientation will be explored 
Attitudes toward abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and homosexuality have a strong 
correlation in the explanation of ideology in the United States. Norrander and Wilcox 
found that women's attitudes towards abortion were significantly related to their liberal 
orientation. Attitudes and beliefs regarding social issues reinforce who women are likely 
to vote for and what ideological orientation they are likely to choose While it may be the 
case that ideology informs opinions in these issue areas, Norrander and Wilcox found that 
the majority of Americans ideological identities are the product of their beliefs and 
attitudes. When people think in ideological terms, their beliefs on social issues in 
particular form the basis for their ideological tendencies. 136 While this study is unable to 
establish causality, a limit of OLS analysis, there is evidence for why attitudes toward 
social issues result in the adoption of a specific ideological identification. Norrander and 
Wilcox examine theoretical considerations on gender and ideology by looking at how 
women's stances on social issues impact their ideological identities over time. They find 
evidence for their theory in Conover and Feldman's research. Conover and Feldman 
136
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argued that people adopted ideological positions based on their stance on certain 
issues.137 Norrander and Wilcox also examine the behavior of political elites as evidence 
for why ideological positions are a consequence of attitudes toward social issues. 
Political elites define the issues that are associated with a liberal and conservative 
ideology.138 For example, Norrander and Wilcox argue that "elite positions connecting 
pro-life attitudes to the conservative label" help Americans link their own attitudes to a 
particular ideological tendency.139 Likewise, when political elites use the terms 
conservative and liberal, people become more familiar with the terminology and start to 
identify with one or the other ideological orientation. 140 Political elites "define" what it 
means to be conservative or liberal by referring to "positions on concrete policy issues." 
So while an ideological identification as conservative or liberal may cause people to have 
certain attitudes on issues, research indicates that ideological orientation may also be a 
consequence of issue positions. 
The following set of hypotheses proposes that as positive attitudes towards the 
justifiability of abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, and divorce increase, women will be 
more liberal. The null for these hypotheses is that there is no relationship between social 
issues and the political orientation of women. The analysis below explains these 
hypotheses. 
Conover and Feldman (1981). The Origins and Meanings of Liberal/ Conservative Self-Identifications. 
American Journal of Political Science, 25,617-645. 
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Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Social Issues 
Merike Blofield conducted some of the most influential research in examining 
Chilean public opinion and attitudes towards abortion and divorce. She conducted 
extensive field research in Chile for six months, interviewing key political actors and 
both conservative and liberal legislators.141 Blofield concluded that the politics that 
surround the issue of abortion remain highly conservative, despite the growing number of 
illegal abortions.142 Within Chile the practice of abortion is not much different from 
countries like the United States, but despite the occurrence it is still illegal. Likewise, 
conservative senators "dominate the discourse" on moral issues "equating therapeutic 
abortion with homicide, and divorce with the dissolution of national unity, poverty, 
increased delinquency, and drug addiction." 143 Socialist leaders up to this point in time 
have been ''timid" in confronting conservatives on moral issues.144 However, Blofield 
finds that reform of social policies is linked with strong support for legalization of 
divorce and abortion and support for leftist parties and a liberal ideology. 
A 2002 survey of public opinion in Chile revealed that public support for the 
legalization of divorce was at 85%. This strong public consent for the legalization of 
divorce resulted in the passage of a conservative divorce jaw in 2004. In contrast to the 
passage of the divorce law, the entrenched right-wing agenda has so far prevented there 
from being a public discourse about the legalization of abortion.145 
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After analyzing the behavior of Chileans reflected in survey data, Blofield 
concluded that Chilean behavior "deviates" significantly from being conservative on 
divorce.142 She finds that a majority of support existed for the legalization of divorce both 
before, and after Chile became a democracy. 146 Table 1 below shows how since the 
1980s there has been an increase in public support for the legalization of divorce, with 
over 80% of the Chilean population believing divorce should be legalized. 147 












Sources: Blofield, Merike (2006) The Politics of'Moral Sin': A Study of Abortion and Divorce in 
Catholic Chile since1990. New York: Routledge. 
Blofield also finds that despite abortion remaining illegal, numerous women 
continue to "resort" to having abortions in dangerous conditions.148 Every year over 94 
abortions per capita are performed and death from abortion is the leading cause of 
"maternal mortality" in Chile.149 Table 2 shows the percentage of public support for the 





should be legalized in cases where the mother's life is at risk, and 58% believe abortion 
should be legalized in cases of rape.150 
Table 2: Support for Abortion in Chile 
When... 
The mother's 



























Sources: Blofield, Merike (2006) The Politics of Moral Sin': A Study of Abortion and Divorce in Catholic 
Chile since 1990. New York: Routledge. 
- No data 
In this research, attitudes toward social issues refer to how justifiable women 
view the social behaviors of divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality. This study 
will operationalize attitudes toward social issues using the justifiability scale from the 
2006 LAPOP dataset for how justifiable women view abortion, euthanasia, divorce, and 
homosexuality. The justifiability scale asks respondents to rank how justifiable they view 
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social behaviors to be on a scale from 1-10 where 1 is coded for never justifiable and 10 
is coded for always justifiable.151 
The Justifiability of Abortion 
The first attitudinal hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes 
towards the justifiability of abortion increase, women will be more liberal The research 
conducted by Blofield suggested that a liberal ideology or support for leftist parties in 
Chile was associated with social support for the legalization of abortion. 
I argue that women who regard abortion as a justifiable social behavior have 
shifted to the left ideologically. Despite the large amount of public support for abortion 
legalization as indicated by Blofield, the lack of public discourse about abortion reform 
has resulted in a smaller number of women who view abortion as a justifiable social 
behavior. This may be the result of abortion remaining an illegal practice in Chile 
Table 3 shows the percentage of Chilean women who view abortion as being a 
never justifiable, justifiable, and always justifiable social behavior. As of 2006, the 
majority of Chilean women respondents view abortion as being a never justifiable social 
behavior, and only 12.7% of women view abortion as always justifiable social behavior, 
these findings indicate two possible conclusions. One indication might be that the 
entrenched right-wing agenda has waged a successful campaign in linking abortion with 
crime and bad social behavior. This is then reflected in the opinions of respondents. 
5
 The LAPOP name for this variable is CHI14A-CHI14G. The exact wording of the social issue question 
is "ahora, utilizando tambten una escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta que punto cree 
que las siguientes situaciones son justificables. En este caso, 1 indica que usted cree que la situaci6n nunca 
se justiflca y 10 indica que usted cree que la situaci6n siempre se justifica. Entonces, ^Cuan justificable 
piensa que es?" On the justifiability scale from 1-10 where 1 is never justifiable and 10 is always 
justifiable, how justifiable do you view the following social behaviors? 
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Another indication may be that Chilean women are torn on the issue of abortion, either 
because it is still illegal and considered to be a private matter in Chilean society, 
preventing women from publically declaring it to be justifiable, or because the Catholic 
Church continues to influence people's religious beliefs. 







To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward 
abortion and the political orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a 
Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of abortion and women's ideological 
orientation. Figure 8 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women view 
abortion to be and their political orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as 
predicted in the research hypothesis, as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of 
abortion increase, women are more liberal. 
53 
Figure 8: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Abortion on their 
Ideological Orientation 
T 
1 never 2 justifiable 10 always 
justifiable 
Justifiability scale of abortion 
A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's r 
coefficient of .205 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level 
between the justifiability of abortion and the political orientation of Chilean women and 
this is in the same direction as predicted by the research hypothesis. As positive attitudes 
toward the justifiability of abortion have increased, Chilean women are more liberal. It 
could be the case that an ideological identification influences one's attitudes and beliefs 
toward social behaviors like abortion. However, while causality cannot be determined 
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with OLS analysis, Norrander and Wilcox found that ideological identities are shaped by 
stances on social issues. 
The Justifiability of Homosexuality 
The second hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards the 
justifiability of homosexuality increase, women will be more liberal. Table 4 shows the 
percentage of Chilean women who view homosexuality as being a never justifiable, 
justifiable, and always justifiable social behavior. The majority of women respondents 
view homosexuality as being a never justifiable social behavior, and only 24.6% of 
women view homosexuality as always justifiable social behavior. These findings indicate 
that attitudes towards homosexuality like abortion are still very much conservative. 







To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward 
homosexuality and the political orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a 
Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of homosexuality and ideological self-
identification. Figure 9 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women 
view homosexuality to be and their political orientation. This relationship is in the same 
direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as positive attitudes toward the 
justifiability of homosexuality have increased, women are more liberal. 
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Figure 9: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Homosexuality on 
their Ideological Orientation 
1 never 
justifiable 
Justifiability scale of homosexuality 
A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's r 
coefficient of .240 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level 
between the justifiability of homosexuality and the political ideology of Chilean women. 
As positive attitudes towards the justifiability of homosexuality have increased, women 
are more liberal. 
The Justifiability of Euthanasia 
The third hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards the 
justifiability of euthanasia increase, women will be more liberal. Table 5 shows the 
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percentage of Chilean women who view euthanasia as being a never justifiable, 
justifiable, and always justifiable social behavior. The majority of Chilean women 
respondents view euthanasia as being a never justifiable social behavior, and only 30.7% 
of women view euthanasia as always justifiable social behavior. These findings indicate 
similar conclusions as the findings about abortion and homosexuality. 







To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes towards 
euthanasia and the political orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a 
Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of euthanasia and ideological orientation. 
Figure 10 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women view euthanasia 
and their political orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the 
research hypothesis, as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of euthanasia have 
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Justifiability scale of euthanasia 
A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's r 
coefficient of .194 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level 
between the justifiability of euthanasia and the political orientation of Chilean women. 
As positive attitudes towards the justifiability of euthanasia have increased, women are 
more liberal. 
Justifiability of Divorce 
The fourth hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards the 
justifiability of divorce increase, women will be more liberal. The research conducted by 
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Blofield suggested that a liberal ideology or support for leftist parties is associated with 
strong support for the legalization of divorce. I argue that changing attitudes towards 
divorce resulted in an ideological shift to the left among Chilean women which in turn 
created a strong public support for the legalization of divorce. Table 6 shows the 
percentage of Chilean women who view divorce as being a never justifiable, justifiable, 
and always justifiable social behavior. The majority of Chilean women respondents view 
divorce as always justifiable social behavior, and 18.2% of women view divorce as a 
justifiable social behavior 
These findings indicate that there is widespread belief among Chilean women that 
divorce is a justifiable social behavior. Despite the domination of the public discourse on 
moral issues by conservative leaders, the election of leftwing presidential candidate 
Lagos in 2000 was crucial in passing a comprehensive divorce law in 2004.152 High 
levels of social support for reform of moral issues, and a larger government role in 
providing basic services to Chileans may have contributed to a shift in the ideological 
orientation of Chileans.153 







To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward 
divorce and the ideological orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a 
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Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of divorce and ideological orientation. 
Figure 11 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women view divorce 
and their ideological orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as predicted in 
the research hypothesis, as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of divorce have 
increased, Chilean women are more liberal. 
Figure 11: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Divorce on their 
Ideological Orientation 






Justifiability scale of divorce 
A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's r 
coefficient of .186 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level 
between the justifiability of divorce and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. As 
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THE ECONOMY, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, AND WOMEN'S 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION 
Thus far, women's attitudes toward social issues have had a profound effect on 
women's ideological orientation in Chile and in explaining women's growing liberalism 
In this chapter the relationship between women's attitudes towards government 
intervention, the economy, and women's ideological orientation will be explored. 
Inglehart and Norris began some of the more influential work examining the 
relationship between government intervention in the economy and the gender gap in 
voting.154 They conducted an analysis of survey questionnaires from the World Values 
Survey in the United States.1S5 Respondents were asked on a scale from 1-10 where they 
would place themselves when asked questions about government intervention. The first 
question asked respondents whether they believed the government should take on more 
responsibility to ensure everyone is provided for. Respondents were also asked whether 
private ownership of business and industry should be increased. For both questions, (1) 
indicated that respondents believed government ownership of business should increase, 
and a (10) indicated that respondents believed private ownership of business should 
;«,.«>.»-<»>156 increase. 
After analyzing the findings, Inglehart and Norris concluded that women in the 
United States often "displayed relatively strong support" for government spending on the 
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welfare state and public services.157 Women were also more likely to support leftist 
parties when these parties had been traditional proponents of a strong social safety net for 
public services.158 Inglehart and Norris also concluded that women's favorable view on 
an active role for the state may have been due to women being the primary beneficiaries 
of government services such as pensions.159 
The Present Economic Situation in Chile 
The question of government intervention in the economy has been of paramount 
importance in Chile.HistoricaHy, economic issues are what really mattered. This was the 
main reason women joined conservatives to oust Allende, and Chilean society has 
disagreed most strongly over the role of the state in the economy. Once Pinochet 
overthrew Allende, Chile adopted a strong neo-liberal model, and the first democratic 
governments assuaged conservative fears by promising not to touch the neoliberal 
models. These models led to high economic growth but also high income inequality. As 
of 2007, Chile has experienced numerous structural reforms including the strengthening 
of social protection and a plan to reform the pension system.160 When Bachelet was 
sworn in as Chile's first female president she vowed to continue to work toward 
bolstering Chile's economic prosperity and eliminating the high level of income 
inequality.161 Since being sworn into office in January 2006, Bachelet has maintained the 
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free market policies that have been in place in Chile for decades. She has also worked 
to increase social spending in the areas of health care and education.1631 argue below that 
women's attitudes towards government intervention in the economy are important and 
influential factors in explaining why Chilean women are more liberal. 
In this research, attitudes toward government intervention and the economy refers 
to whether or not women agree with the following statements: the health care system 
should remain the same, there should be an increase in taxes, and the income of people 
should be equal. This study will operationalize attitudes toward government intervention 
in the economy using a scale from the 2006 LAPOP dataset for whether or not women 
agree with the above statements.164 The scale asks respondents to rank how much they 
agree with the above statements on a scale from 1-10 where 1 is coded for do not agree 
and 10 is coded for do agree. 
Income Equality 
The fifth hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes toward income 
equality increase, the liberal orientation of Chilean women will also increase. To test the 
null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward income equality and 
women's ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test 
between attitudes toward income equality and ideological orientation. Table 7 shows the 
164
 The LAPOP name for this variable is CHI13A-CHI13C. The exact wording used in the government 
intervention question is, "Ahora me gustaria conocer su opini6n acerca de algunos asuntos mas especificos. 
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and 10 indicates you do agree where do you place yourself? 
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income disparities that have existed in Chile since 1970. In 1995, the richest quintile 
received 61% of consumed income, while the poorest quintile received only 3.5%. 
Income disparity remains a severe problem under the Bachelet administration and 
attitudes towards income equality may be reflected in Chilean women's ideological 
orientation. 
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Chant, Sylvia, and Nkiki Craske (2003) Gender in Latin America. New 
Figure 12 suggests there is a relationship between income equality and women's 
ideological orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the 
research hypothesis; women who agree that incomes should be more equal will be more 
liberal (r= 105, p<.01). Essentially, income quality means that people want incomes to be 
more equal, and for the disparities between incomes to disappear. 
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Figure 12: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Income Equality on 






Do you agree that income should be more equal? 
Health Care 
The sixth hypothesis in this study predicts that women who agree that the health 
care system should remain the same will be more liberal. To test the null hypothesis that 
there is no relationship between women's attitudes towards health care and their 
ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test between 
health care and ideological orientation. A Pearson's correlation test shows that there is 
not a significant relationship between women's agreement with health care remaining the 
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same and women's ideological orientation (p=254). Figure 13 further illustrates this 
trend. 
Figure 13: The Effect of Women's Attitudes toward Health Care on their 
Ideological Orientation 





Do you agree that the health care system should remain the same? 
Women who agree that the health care system should remain the same are more 
liberal. The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected. Interviewer response effects 
such as social desirability may be why no significant correlation was found between 
women's attitudes towards health care and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. 
There is more consensus in Chile today regarding the economic model in place and this 
may have affected how influential women's attitudes toward government intervention is 
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on women's ideological tendencies. The lack of a relationship may also be due to other 
factors being more influential than women's attitudes towards health care in explaining 
Chilean women's liberal orientation 
Raise Taxes 
The seventh hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards 
taxes being raised to fund social programs increase, Chilean women will be more liberal. 
To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward raising 
taxes to fund social programs and women's ideological orientation, this research will 
utilize a Pearson's correlation test between raising taxes and ideological orientation. A 
Pearson's correlation test shows that there is not a significant relationship between 
women's agreement with the need to raise taxes to fund social programs and women's 
ideological identification (p=258). Figure 14 further confirms this trend 
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Figure 14: The Effect of Women's Attitudes toward Raising Taxes on their 
Ideological Orientation 
1 do not 
agree 
Do you agree that taxes should be raised to fund social programs? 
As positive attitudes toward raising taxes to fund social programs have increased, 
women did not become more liberal. The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected. 
Interviewer response effects such as social desirability may be why no significant 
correlation was found between women's attitudes towards raising taxes to fund social 
programs and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. The lack of a relationship 
may also be due to other factors being more influential than women's attitudes towards 
raising taxes to fond social programs in explaining Chilean women's liberal orientation. 
Also, there is consensus today in Chile regarding the economic model. Perhaps this is 
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why attitudes towards government intervention in the economy are less influential in 
predicting women's ideological behavior. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Multivariate regression analysis will predict which of the significant variable(s) 
best explain Chilean women's liberal orientation. Multivariate analysis is necessary to 
test the hypotheses concerning structural and attitudinal factors together, modeling the 
variables simultaneously. It is also imperative to hold some variables constant while 
determining the significance of others, i.e., holding structural factors constant while 
assessing impact of attitudinal Ones, and vice versa. Table 8 depicts how much influence 
age, school years, religion, marital status, women's attitudes towards the justifiability of 
abortion, divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality, and income equality have on women's 
liberal orientation. The trimmed model includes only the significant variables 165 
16?
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An F test indicated that these models were significant at the .001 level. Coefficients are 
unstandardized, with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
In the analysis of the original model age, school years, religion, attitudes towards 
divorce, and attitudes toward euthanasia were not significant predictors of the ideological 
orientation of Chilean women. These variables had no effect on the ideological 
orientation of Chilean women and were dropped in the Trimmed Model. 
The R2 value is interpreted as the percentage of variance explained by the 
dependent variable. The Trimmed Model indicates that the Adjusted R2 value is. 103 with 
a standard error estimate of 2.563. In the Trimmed Model the Adjusted R2 indicates that 
about 10% of the variance in women's ideological orientation is explained by marital 
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status, and attitudes towards the justifiability of abortion, homosexuality, and income 
equality. Although the overall model is significantly statistic, it fails to predict 90% of the 
variance in women's ideological orientation. 
The ANOVA examines the significance of the model as a whole.166 The F test 
indicates whether all the variables when tested together significantly predict women's 
ideological orientation.167 The F test also indicates whether the variance explained by the 
line is greater than the unexplained variance.168 The ANOVA shows that the F statistic of 
19.842 is significant at the .001 level.169 
Married women (or value coded as one) were (.966) less liberal than non-married 
women. This finding is consistent with prior research that suggests married women are 
more likely to self-identify as conservative then non-married women. This finding is also 
consistent with the findings in the second hypothesis. Women who are married are .966 
less liberal than non-married women. 
The t value for the justifiability of abortion is 2.957 and is significant at the .01 
level. As women are more willing to justify abortion, they are more liberal. For every 
one unit increase in the justifiability of abortion women are more liberal. While it is 
impossible to determine causality when using survey data, the findings are strengthened 
by prior research suggesting attitudes towards the justifiability of abortion and other 
social issues are important indicators of women's ideological orientation. 
The t value for the justifiability of homosexuality is 3.912 and is significant at the 
.001 level. As women are more willing to justify homosexuality, they are more liberal. 
166
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For every one unit increase in the justifiability of abortion women are more liberal. 
Chilean women's attitudes towards the justifiability of homosexuality are a significant 
predictor of their ideological orientation 
The t value for women's attitudes towards income equality is 2.341 and is 
significant at the 05 level. As women come to agree that incomes should be more equal, 
they are more liberal. For every one unit increase in women agreeing that incomes 
should be more equal women are more liberal. Chilean women's attitudes towards the 
justifiability of homosexuality are a significant predictor of their ideological orientation. 
The multivariate results show that the other independent variables were 
insignificant predictors of the ideological orientation of Chilean women. However, in 
order to say that they are theoretically important, this study addresses muticolliiiearity. it 
may be that the independent variables are so strongly correlated with one another that the 
impact they have on the ideological orientation of Chilean women is weakened. The 
results from the pearson r correlation matrix found in Table 9 and 10 lead me to believe 
that there is a presence of multicollinearity in this study. For example, it may be that 
marital status is a predictor of ideology, but its effects are compromised by its high 
correlation with whether or not a person belongs to a religious denomination. 
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Variables 
How justifiable is Pearsonr 
abortion? Sig (2-tailed) 
How justifiable is Pearsonr 
homosexuality? Sig (2-tailed) 
How justifiable is Pearson r 
euthanasia? Sig. (2-tailed) 
How justifiable is Pearson r 









































'. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study has examined Chilean women's ideological orientation, as well as the 
relationship between social demographics, attitudes towards social issues, and attitudes 
toward government intervention in the economy. This analysis indicated that Chilean 
women should not be pigeon-holed as staunch conservatives. Women's ideological 
orientation in Chile is not radically different from that of men, according to the 2006 
survey data. This study has also identified several factors that explain Chilean women's 
ideological orientation today. 
This research shows that social demographics have a small but significant affect 
on the ideological identification of Chilean women/Similar to Norrander and Wilcox 
findings in the U.S., married women in Chile are less likely to be liberal than their 
unmarried counterparts. Norrander and Wilcox find that the effect of marriage on the 
ideological identity of women has strengthened over time.170 A push for the legalization 
of divorce by Chilean political elites in 2004, and an increase in the number of single 
women, has led to an adoption of liberal social attitudes which has translated into a more 
liberal identity. Single women are also less likely to espouse the same conservative 
familial values that have penetrated Chilean society than their married counterparts. 
Income was not a significant predictor of whether women were conservative or 
liberal in Chile. This is interesting because Norrander and Wilcox found that the 
influence of income on the ideological identities of women in the U.S. has declined over 
time because there is less of an "ideological difference" between women of different 
170
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income groups in the United States. In Chile, because women have limited access to 
formal employment opportunities, income disparities between women may be less 
common. This may explain why income was not a significant predictor of women's 
ideological identities 
Women's attitudes towards abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and homosexuality 
were found to be significant predictors of Chilean women's liberal ideological 
orientation. This is not surprising given the contentious nature of divorce reform and the 
debate over the legalization of abortion. These results also infer that stances on issues 
feature prominently in whether or not someone adopts a liberal or conservative identity. 
Interestingly, a statistically significant relationship was found between women's 
attitudes towards income equality and their ideological orientation. This indicates that 
women's attitudes towards government intervention and the economy may be a slight 
factor in the liberal orientation of Chilean women. Women who viewed income equality 
favorably were more liberal. This finding may be due to the large income disparities that 
exist between Chilean women and men. Chilean women are less likely than men to have 
access to formal employment opportunities. As a consequence, women may be more 
likely to view income equality as a favorable reform program. 
For the most part, women's stances on economic issues were unrelated to the 
formation of their ideological identities. These findings are important because they 
coincide with trends in the U.S. Norrander and Wilcox find that the role of government in 
providing jobs and economic security "are becoming less important" in the formation of 
Norrander and Wilcox 2007 
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"ideological identities" in the U.S.172 Also, while stances on economic issues are 
becoming less important for men and women in the U.S. over time, they remain "one of 
the stronger influences" on men's attitudes.173 
Chilean women's stance on the issue of abortion featured more prominently in the 
ideological divisions between liberals and conservatives in Chile and in the U.S. 
Norrander and Wilcox found that a conservative identity in the United States was being 
formed by attitudes on social issues. Those in opposition to abortion and those who 
advocated limited rights for women were more likely to be conservative.174 This is 
interesting because attitudes on women's rights may be undergoing a dramatic change in 
Chile, leading Chileans to adopt a more liberal identity. 
Historically in Chile, ideological divisions over the economic model have led to 
the destruction of democracy and democratic institutions. What this research shows is 
that there is now consensus between conservatives and liberals on the type of economic 
model found in Chile and less consensus on social issues. What really divides 
conservative and liberal Chileans today are the social issues. This bodes well for 
democratic stability because a lack of consensus over economic issues has been a driving 
reason for Chile's turbulent relationship with democracy. 
This research adds to the existing body of literature about gender and ideology in 
Latin America. Several findings indicate why Chilean women have shifted to the left and 
now self-identify as liberal. While it does not examine every potential explanation of why 
Chilean women have shifted to the left ideologically, it does address social 
172
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demographics, women's attitudes toward government intervention, and women's 
attitudes toward social issues. 
This research also has great implications for Chilean women and their 
participation in the political process. Presently, Chilean women have become bigger 
players in politics than ever before. This may be because a more liberal ideological 
identifications leads to changes in values regarding women's roles in society and politics. 
Overwhelming support for Bachelet in Chile's presidential election implies not only that 
ideological change ushers in democratic stability, but also that ideological change has 
allowed women to become prominent actors in the Chilean political system. This study 
shows that ideological change and identification in Chile really matters. As a doctor, 
single mother, and a woman, socialist president Bachelet exemplifies what it means to be 
a liberal woman in Chile today. More Chilean women may take a cue from Bachelet arid 
become incredible political actors in the Chilean government and civil society. When 
women secure their role in the Chilean political system, the likelihood that there will be 
reform of existing social laws governing social behaviors increases. 
This research may encourage future scholars to conduct similar studies examining 
the relationship between women's attitudes towards economic issues, democracy, and the 
ideological orientation of Chilean women, and Latin American women in general. 
Additionally, the findings of this study may applicable in an examination of the 
ideological orientation of women in other areas of the world such as in the Middle East 
where women are known to be socially conservative. While Chile is a unique case, this 
research may also lead to future research on the effects of demographics, attitudes toward 
social issues, and attitudes towards government intervention on partisanship, vote choice, 
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